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 Abstract - Asset market experiments are analyzed by distinguishing, ex post facto, participants 
who trade on fundamentals versus those who trade on momentum (i.e., buying when the price is 
rising). The distinction is made when prices are above fundamental value, so that (in each period) 
those who have more offers than bids (net offerers) are classified as fundamentalists while those 
who have more bids than offers (net bidders) are defined to be momentum players. By analyzing the 
data of individual behavior we are able to address a number of key questions regarding bubbles. We 
find evidence that the cash supply of the momentum traders diminishes and the cash supply of the 
fundamental traders increases as the bubble forms. This suggests that the bubble is fueled by the 
cash of the momentum players and the reversal is caused by inadequate cash in their possession. 
These data are used in conjunction with a difference equation for price dynamics for two groups. 
The momentum traders exhibit a positive coefficient for price derivatives and a very small negative 
coefficient for trading based upon the deviation from fundamental value. Surprisingly, however, the 
fundamental traders, who exhibit a positive coefficient for trading on valuation, also exhibit a 
significantly positive coefficient for trend based buying. Thus, even those who are net offerers, 
classified as fundamentalists, are selling less and buying more of overvalued stock when there is a 
strong positive recent price change. There is also evidence that some fundamentalists change 
strategy to momentum trading as prices soar. An additional result is that the trend coefficient of the 
momentum traders vanishes with the implementation of an “open book” that allows traders to see 
all trades as they are entered. 
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    Financial bubbles such as the high-tech/internet bubble of the late 1990’s have posed a 
significant challenge to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). At the later stages of this 
bubble, stock prices were so far removed from valuation that they appeared to be 
completely disjoint from the classical expected return models. Yet there have been only 
modest efforts in the academic community to understand the mechanisms that underlie 
this tremendous deviation from realistic value—even though a large segment of the 
population lost trillions of dollars as a consequence. Several years after this bubble we 
have little more knowledge about the strategies and motivations of individuals than we 
did at the time. Of course, this bubble is only the latest of many such episodes that 
include the 1980’s bubble of Japanese stocks, the 1920’s bubble in US stocks, as well as 






















surprise in that it occurred at a time when information was so readily available from a 
variety of sources, thereby eliminating a key hypothesis that incomplete information 
alone is to blame. 
     Market  bubbles  have  been  studied  extensively from one perspective, namely, 
experimental economics (see Davis and Holt [1993] for a review). Since the 1980’s 
researchers have produced hundreds of bubbles in asset market experiments in which 
traders can buy or sell an asset through a computer network (see e.g., Sunder [1995], 
Sonnemans et. al. [2004], Hommes et. al. [2005]). At first, experimenters sought to find 
conditions under which a bubble could be created. Surprisingly, bubbles arose without 
any specific mechanisms to create them. As in the world markets the initial bubbles 
results were met with denial, with critics claiming that a number of elements missing in 
these experiments could account for the large deviations from fundamentals. These 
included the absence of short selling, margin buying, a futures market, etc. However, 
experiments showed that bubbles persisted when any of these were introduced (Porter 
and Smith [1994]). Only experience as a group tended to reduce the size of the bubble 
(Smith, Suchanek and Williams [1988]). Of course, in world markets there are always 
some newcomers with little or no experience, so this discovery is only limited 
consolation for EMH.  One approach that has provided an explanation for the motivations 
that underlie bubbles was presented in mathematical models that incorporated a 
preference function that depended not only on deviation from fundamental value but on 
the price trend as well (see e.g., Caginalp and Ermentrout [1990], Caginalp and 
Balenovich [1999] and references therein). These models incorporated the conservation 
of cash and asset, and made the predictions that (i) a larger cash supply would result in a 
larger bubble; (ii) a lower initial price would yield a larger bubble, both contrary to the 
expectations of EMH. Both of these predictions were confirmed by experiment 
(Caginalp, Porter and Smith [2001]). These experiments also demonstrated a role, though 
limited, for the open book, whereby all traders can see the full set of orders, in mitigating 
the size of the bubble.  
    There are two main advantages in using experiments: (i) conditions can be adjusted 
and experiments repeated; (ii) detailed data sets about the actions of particular traders are 
available. In this work, we utilize the latter feature, as we distinguish the behaviors of 
different traders and test hypotheses with this information. The first step is to define a 
criterion for separating traders who trade on fundamentals from those who trade on 
momentum. Some traders who do not fit either criterion are in a third group. We can then 
test a basic hypothesis that the peak of the bubble occurs when the momentum traders 
have depleted much of their cash. This hypothesis is confirmed. With the price being far 
above the actual value at this point, the fundamentalists are not interested in buying, and 
consequently the trading price drops precipitously.  
     Beyond this result we seek to utilize a discretized version of the differential equations 
discussed above to evaluate the coefficients related to each of the two groups. In 
particular, we use the data in terms of cash and asset supply for each trader and the 
trading prices to see if the coefficients are of the correct sign and statistically significant. 
If so, it provides a confirmation of the model using two distinct groups. Furthermore, we 
would like to determine whether the momentum traders are influenced by fundamentals, 




2. The experiments 
 
        We utilize the data from experiments reported by Caginalp et al. [2003]. These 
experiments consisted of 9 to 14 participants trading through a computer network in 
which there are 15 periods of three minutes each with a one minute break after each 
period.  A very detailed set of interactive instructions on the computer terminal requires 
each participant to enter, cancel and understand trades. The instructions are self-paced, as 
the program does not allow the participant to move on until each step is carried out 
correctly. The instruction part of the session lasts approximately one hour. Thus, the 
format of the instructions eliminates the possibility that a participant reads the 
instructions, but is confused about the “nature of the task” or the “structure of the asset.” 
Such confusion has been observed as a source of bubble formation in experiments of Lei, 
Noussair and Plott [2001], and Lei and Vesely [2004]. There is also a practice session at 
the end of the instructions, so that cognitive errors are minimized in subsequent trading. 
Participants are informed prior to the start of the experiment that each share of the asset 
pays a dividend with expectation value 24 cents at the end of each period. Hence the 
fundamental value -- which is computed for the traders at the end of each period as the 
sum of dividends expected to be obtained until the end of the experiment—is a declining 
function that starts at $3.60 and is 24 cents during the 15
th period. The value of the asset 
(namely 24 cents times the number of periods remaining) is computed and remains on the 
computer screen and is updated at the start of each period. Hence this eliminates the 
possibility that traders are making decision errors due to miscalculations, thereby further 
reducing the role of “confusion” in bubble formation. In a typical experiment, prices start 
lower than $3.60 but start rising during the first few periods, moving past the expected 
dividend value until a peak is reached somewhere between the eighth and 14
th periods. 




























2.1 Trading mechanism 
 
    To implement the trading, the experiments utilize an order-driven market mechanism, 
whereby participants can submit limit orders to buy or to sell from both sides of the 
market. Simultaneous execution of submitted limit orders at a single moment in time at a 
single price is the essence of this trading mechanism. Two slightly different variations of 
this basic trading mechanism are used in the experiments. The first mechanism, used in 
12 “closed book” experiments, is a sealed bid double auction in which the subjects can 
submit limit orders but cannot see the orders of the other participants. They can only see 
the resulting price and volume. The second trading mechanism is a standard call auction 
in which participants enter their respective bids or asks and see them entered into the 
auction in real-time. If, based upon competing bids or asks, the subjects wish to alter their 
price or number of shares, they can do so. In these 11 “open book” experiments, 
participants see all submitted orders, but not the identity of the traders placing the orders. 
The clearing price in both trading mechanisms can be regarded as a consensus price as its 
determination is based on the full set of submitted bids and asks. The uniform execution 
price is determined at the end of the period by ordering the bids and asks in descending 
and ascending order respectively, and matching the quantity supplied to the quantity 
demanded. Transactions occur when the bid and ask prices are equal. Traders who bid 
above the clearing price become buyers and traders who submit asks below the clearing 
price become sellers.  
 
2.2 Classifying trader behavior 
 
    Using the experimental data, the classification of each trader into one of the three 
groups is done in each period. We do not make the assumption that a trader of one type 
will necessarily remain so for the entire experiment. A trader can be classified in a 
different category in different periods. The data will determine the extent to which traders 
change strategies.  Momentum traders buy stocks with the expectation of a continued rise 
in prices and sell stocks with the expectation of a continued fall in prices. Fundamental 
traders trade shares based on the expected fundamental value of the asset. They sell when 
they believe that an asset is overvalued and buy when they believe an asset is 
undervalued. We do not claim to classify behavior as rational or irrational. We 
distinguish between momentum and fundamental trading. Indeed, there may be rational 
reasons for an investor to be a momentum trader (see DeLong et. al. [1990]). 
    On the basis of the definitions above, we separate the traders in each period in which 
the clearing price is higher than the fundamental value into three groups: fundamental 
traders, momentum traders and neutral traders. To classify each trader into one of the 
three groups we assign a positive point for each fundamental bid or ask and a negative 
point for each momentum bid or ask that the trader submits. Classifying a trade as 
“fundamental” requires a bid to buy at a price below the expected dividend value or an 
ask to sell at a price that is above this value. Similarly, a “momentum” bid is one that 
offers to buy at a price above the expected dividend value or an ask to sell at a price that 
is below this value. In order to be able to distinguish between the two, we focus on 
periods in which the price exceeds the fundamental value. If the sum of the points that a 
trader accumulates throughout the period is equal to or greater than one, we classify this 
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trader as a fundamental trader. If the sum is less than or equal to negative one, the trader 
is assigned to the group of momentum traders. All traders who accumulate zero points 
throughout the period comprise the neutral group.  
 
 
3. Experimental results 
  
     To answer the questions posed above we test first whether the levels of cash in the 
hands of the momentum and fundamental traders differ significantly through time. In an 
earlier paper Caginalp, Porter and Smith [2001] show that the level of cash in an 
experimental economy is highly correlated with the size of a bubble for both the open-
book and closed-book experiments. Taking this one step further we suggest that it is the 
bidding of the momentum traders that fuels the bubble. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
towards the peak of the bubble the cash holdings of momentum traders decrease while 
those of fundamental traders increase. 
    To compare the levels of cash of the momentum and fundamental traders we combine 
the data from all closed and open book experiments and compare the levels of cash of 
each group of traders from each period starting with five periods before the peak price 
formed in the market, and ending with two periods after with a t-test, assuming that the 
two samples have unequal variances.  
    Table 1 reports the amount of cash of each group from period T-5 to period T+2, with 
T denoting the period in which the price is the highest. The data include all eleven open-
book and twelve closed-book experiments. The t-tests confirm that at the group level the 
fundamental traders have significantly more cash (at least at the 10% level of 
significance) than the momentum traders in each period from period T-5 to period T+2.  
 
 
  Average cash of 
fundamental group 
Average cash of 
momentum group 
Average cash of 
neutral group 
T-5  8892.39 3722.89  2858.50 
T-4  7464.50 4903.79  2635.14 
T-3  6855.69 4481.00  3995.31 
T-2  7786.74 4450.44  4078.59 
T-1  8866.09 4042.93  3083.71 
T  9640.20 3049.87  3753.41 
T+1  9385.28 3104.33  3847.60 
T+2  10402.20 2457.93  3543.07 
 
Table 1. Average cash holdings across groups. 
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Fig. 2. Average cash holdings across groups. 
 
 
    Figure 2 shows that the cash holding of the fundamental group increases from T-3 to 
T+2. Similarly, the cash holding of the momentum group generally decreases during T-4 
to T+2. The earliest periods in that graph correspond to the periods in which the bubble is 
not yet very large so that the distinctions in trader behavior are not as pronounced. The 
statistical significance of these changes will be evident below with additional tests. This 
suggests that the fundamentalists are lightening up on shares as the price moves further 
away from the expected dividend value. Similarly, the momentum traders put an even 
greater share of their cash into stocks as the price moves higher. 
    To obtain more detailed information on the characteristics of individual traders in the 
experiments, we also investigate the levels of cash on a per trader basis. Table 2 reports 
the cash levels from period T-5 to period T+2 on a per trader basis. The t-test results 
indicate that the average momentum trader has significantly less cash than the average 
fundamental trader in each of the time periods.  
 
  Average cash per 
fundamental trader 





T-5  1674.52 1249.23  963.79 
T-4  1623.20 1165.63  1210.24 
T-3  1357.17 1241.25  1494.63 
T-2  1522.75 1224.90  1457.01 
T-1  1684.45 1051.09  1273.23 
T  1656.37 1270.46  1234.94 
T+1  1536.85 1275.74  1332.85 
T+2  1502.63 1044.94  1308.47 
 
Table 2. Average cash holdings per trader across groups. 
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Fig. 3. Average cash holdings per trader across groups. 
 
    The average cash per trader data is not as pronounced as the total amount of cash for 
each group, since part of the equation involves the number of traders of each type. We 
will see below that the average number of momentum traders decreases from 4.14 in 
period T-4 to just 2.26 in period T.  
    The difference in the levels of cash (and asset) are likely to be very important in terms 
of timing the peak. Once the momentum traders are below some critical level of cash 
there is very little to power further rises, since the fundamentalists are unlikely to buy, 
and the remaining group (neutral traders) are unlikely as a group to provide a significant 
net buy/sell that would fuel the rally. 
    To better investigate the evolution of the cash positions of the two types of traders 
through time we calculate the correlations of time with cash presented in Table 3. All 
correlations are significant. 
 
  Average cash of 
fundamental group 
Average cash of 
momentum group 
Average cash per 
fundamental trader 
Average cash per 
momentum trader 
T-5 to T  0.45 -0.49 0.11 -0.17 
 
Table 3. Correlations of cash with time. 
 
    Table 3 shows that the amount of cash of the fundamental group and the amount of 
cash of the average fundamental trader generally increase through time, while the amount 
of cash of the momentum group and the amount of cash of the average momentum trader 
generally decrease through time.  
    Further Table 4 reports the correlations between the variables using the observations 
from all peak periods from all experiments. The results reveal that the total cash in the 
hands of the fundamental traders has a negative effect on the maximum positive deviation 
of price from fundamental value at the peak consistent with our hypothesis. The greater 
the amount of cash of the fundamentalists is, the smaller the bubble is. The correlations 
also show that the higher the cash of momentum traders is, the higher the difference of 








Average cash of 
fundamental 
traders 







 per momentum 
trader 
Price –  
fundamental value 
1 -0.12  0.46 0.18 0.19 
Average cash of 
fundamental traders 
-0.12 1 -0.29 0.66 0.08 
Average cash of 
momentum traders 
0.46 -0.29  1  0.20  0.57 
Average cash per 
fundamental trader 
0.18 0.66 0.20  1  0.25 
Average cash per 
momentum trader 
0.19 0.08 0.57  0.25  1 
 
Table 4. Correlations at the peak. 
 
    As  expected,  there  is  a negative correlation between the levels of cash of the 
momentum and the fundamental groups at the peak. The higher the proportion of cash 
held by the fundamental group, the lower the cash level of the momentum group is. Also 
there is a positive correlation between the levels of cash of the average momentum trader 
and average fundamental trader. The higher the total cash endowment in an experiment 
is, the higher the cash per traders is. A t-test of the difference in the number of traders of 
each type when the deviation from fundamental value is the highest shows that the 
number of fundamental traders is significantly greater than the number of momentum 
traders. On average there are twice as many fundamental traders as momentum traders at 
the peak of the bubble.  
 
  Average number of 
fundamental traders 




T-5  5.56 3.11 0.04 
T-4  4.79 4.14 0.51 
T-3  4.94 3.50 0.12 
T-2  4.88 3.47 0.04 
T-1  5.45 3.41  <0.01 
T  5.70 2.26  <0.01 
T+1  6.15 2.30  <0.01 
T+2  6.93 1.73  <0.01 
 
Table 5. Average number of traders comparisons. 
 
 
4. Price formation 
 
    This  section  examines  the  effect  of momentum and fundamental traders on the 
determination of prices in the experiments. We use an excess demand model whose basic 
equilibration principle is based on the premise that prices move in the direction 
determined by supply and demand in the market. The model, presented below, 
generalizes that introduced by Caginalp and Ermentrout [1990] (see Caginalp and 
Balenovich [1999] for other references). It assumes that both the fundamental and 
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momentum traders take into consideration past price changes and price deviations from 
fundamental value. Other works, particularly in recent years have also focused on similar 
ideas, including Lux [1995], [1998], Brock and Hommes [1998], Lux and Marchesi 
[2000], Farmer and Joshi [2002] and Westerhoff [2004]. 










,            ( 1 )    
 
where D and S denote the demand and supply at time t. The model indicates that prices 
move in the direction of clearing the market. 
    The demand for shares is a function of the cash in the economy and a preference for 
holding a portion of wealth in stocks. The supply of shares is a function of their price, 
quantity and a preference rate of converting stocks into cash. If  0 N , j, 
j k , 
j M , 
j N  
denote the number of different types of traders, the trader type, the conversion preference 
rate of cash into stocks of traders of group j, the cash of group j, and the number of shares 










































.         ( 2 )  
        The conversion preference rate of cash into shares, 
j k , is a function of two 
components: a momentum or a trend factor, 
Pdt
dP






a P denotes the fundamental value of a share. The first component represents the 
instantaneous rate of change in price relative to its current level, while the second 






















1 ,        ( 3 )  
where 
j Q1 and 
j Q2  are constants. 
    Thus, 
j k can be regarded as the rate at which a unit of cash is submitted to the market, 
while 1-
j k is the rate at which a unit of asset is submitted for sale. Note that ½ represents 
the neutral preference rate, where the rate of submission of shares for cash equals the 
opposite preference. In principle, the rate 
j k can depend on as many factors as there are 
reasons to buy or sell. Classically, the only motivation to buy would be the perception 
that the asset is undervalued. This component is quantified for group j  through the 
coefficient
j Q2 . Our hypothesis is that momentum trading characterized by a preference 
for buying as the asset rises is also a motivating factor. The coefficient for group j is 
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denoted 
j Q1 . Note that the magnitude of 
j Q1 will be decided by the data. If there were no 
momentum trading for any group we would have 
j Q1 = 0 within statistical error.  
    With the assumption that only the fundamental and momentum traders exert influence 
on the price there are two groups of traders. Hence (2) reduces to 
  () ()
1
1 1
2 2 1 1





P N k P N k
M k M k
Pdt
dP
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1 2    (5) 
    
    Approximating 
dt
dP
 with  t t P P − +1  in (4), and with 1 − − t t P P  in (5) and substitution of (5) 
into (4) we obtain (6).  
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where i and t indicate the experiment and the period, respectively.  
    The basic strategy is to perform a multi-linear regression to estimate 
1
1 Q , 
1
2 Q , 
2
1 Q  and 
2
2 Q  (recall that the superscript refers to the group while the subscript is 1 for the trend 
and 2 for the valuation coefficient) using all of the data of the experiments. The cash and 
asset position of each trader can be computed. In some of the experiments the dividends 
were paid immediately after the period, adding to the cash position. This is taken into 
account in the difference equations. In performing this linear regression, however, we 
cannot assume that the data are all independent since many periods of data are generated 
by the same participants. A multi-linear regression can be done using the Fixed Effects 
Model that compensates for these dependencies, and is consequently more reliable than 
an ordinary linear regression. The results are presented in Table 6 and Table 7 for the 









t-ratio  p-value 
1
1 Q   0.447  0.239  1.866  0.07 
1
2 Q   -0.037  0.005  -7.843  0.00 
2
1 Q   0.509  0.152  3.349  0.00 
2
2 Q   0.073  0.009  7.930  0.00 
 










t-ratio  p-value 
1
1 Q   -0.018  0.063  -0.290  0.77 
1
2 Q   0.003  0.015  0.223  0.82 
2
1 Q   0.101  0.048  2.100  0.04 
2
2 Q   0.050  0.007  7.115  0.00 
 
Table 7. Price dynamics for the open book experiments. 
 
    The
2 R is 0.82 for the closed book experiments and 0.71 for the open book 
experiments. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of joint non-significance 
at less than the 1% level of significance with 
2
15 χ  of 135.4 and
2
14 χ  of 102.9 for the closed 
and open book experiments, respectively.       
        For the closed book experiments we find that the trend coefficient, 
1
1 Q , for the 
momentum traders is 0.447 with a standard error of .24 and p-value of 0.066. The value 
coefficient is significant with a p-value of 0 (to four decimal places). For the fundamental 
traders, the momentum coefficient, 
2
1 Q , is 0.51 with a standard error of 0.15 and p-value 
of 0.0013. The value coefficient, 
2
2 Q , is 0.073 with a standard error of 0.0092 and p-value 
of zero (to four decimal places). The complete statistics are displayed in Table 6. 
    Hence we see that the fundamental traders nevertheless are just as strongly influenced 
by price movements as the momentum group. In other words, if the recent price change 
in an overvalued stock is small, the fundamentalists are far more likely to sell than if the 
price change is strongly positive. Thus it appears that when prices initially move above 
fundamental value, there is generally a strong uptrend. The momentum traders are buying 
aggressively (as indicated by the coefficient 
1
1 Q ). However, the fundamental traders are 
not selling aggressively, since their momentum coefficient 
2
1 Q  is also positive. 
Furthermore, since prices are not yet very far from fundamental value at this point, the 









2  is not very large. Hence, prices rise further until (a) there is less 
cash in the hands of the momentum traders, and (b) the difference between the 









2 term more 
significant. This offers some insight into the initial puzzle in our data: there are more 
fundamental traders than momentum traders, yet the price encounters little resistance as it 
moves up past the fundamental value.  
    For the open book experiments we find that the trend coefficient of the momentum 
traders, 
1
1 Q  is within the standard error of zero, as is the value coefficient, 
1
2 Q . The 
fundamentalist group has a value coefficient 
2
2 Q  of 0.05 with standard error of 0.007 with 
a p-value of zero (to four decimal places).  Hence we find that the fundamentalists exhibit 
a value coefficient that is similar to the closed book case. However, the trend coefficient 
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is about one-fifth of the magnitude of the closed book experiments. Together with the 
zero trend coefficient for the momentum traders, this suggests that there is a clear 
difference in the trading strategies between participants in the two types of experiments. 
In the open book experiments, the traders who are net buyers above the fundamental 
value appear more like noise traders than trend based ones. In any case it appears that the 
open book framework has a strong dampening effect on trend chasing. It is known 
(Smith, Suchanek and Williams [1988]) that bids tend to dry up near the peak of a 
bubble. Perhaps in the open book case this becomes evident to participants who would be 
eager to buy when the price is rising sharply. With an open book they may become aware 
that the price has risen sharply but there are not many buyers left! 
    Previous papers (e.g., Caginalp and Ermentrout [1990]) have studied the mathematical 
properties of these equations in various parameter regimes. While large parameters for 
the momentum coefficient can result in unbounded oscillations, the parameters that we 
have estimated using this data result in a sufficiently small coefficient for the momentum 
coefficient so that the prevailing regime exhibits one stable equilibrium. 
        Other papers that estimate the impact of heterogeneous market participants using 




6. Conclusion   
 
    Experimental asset markets contain much more data than just the trading prices. In this 
paper, we have utilized detailed data for individual traders. This has allowed us to 
classify the traders in terms of net bidders (momentum traders) or net offerers 
(fundamental traders) when the trading price is above the fundamental value. We find 
that the momentum traders have gradually diminishing cash (both as a group and per 
trader) and have cash levels near the lows when the bubble peaks. The opposite is true of 
the fundamental traders. This suggests that the bubble is fueled by the cash of the 
momentum traders, even though they are consistently outnumbered by the 
fundamentalists. The bubble seems to reverse due to the diminished buying power of the 
momentum players. The cash of fundamentalists increases as the peak is approached, but 
they are not interested in buying at this point. Thus one might summarize the buying at 
the peak as: “Those who would, could not; those who could, would not.”  
    The question arises as to how the price can move above the fundamental value so 
easily despite the fact that there are more fundamentalists than momentum traders. The 
price dynamics equations appear to provide an answer to this puzzle. Even those traders 
who are net sellers when the price exceeds fundamental value are strongly influenced by 
the trend, according to our statistical analysis of the difference equations. When the price 
is initially moving past the fundamental value, the premium is relatively small but the 
price derivative is often large. Thus, it seems that the fundamentalists are not selling very 
aggressively at this point. The statistics indicate that they are more likely to sell as the 
deviation from fundamental value increases and the price change is more muted. Hence, 
an asset whose price is considerably higher than fundamental value, and beginning to 
stall becomes very risky to own.  
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    This analysis offers some insight into the high-tech bubble of the late 1990’s, when a 
huge amount of cash poured into the market from recent investors who had little 
experience and were largely influenced by price movements. Part of the rationale for 
ignoring fundamentals was based on the idea that these benchmarks were antiquated 
metrics. As the market moved into the stratosphere in comparison with fundamentals, one 
might assume that more seasoned investors would be selling. If one were to extrapolate 
from the experimental analysis, one could conjecture that the fundamentalists during the 
high-tech bubble were also somewhat reluctant to sell as they observed sharply rising 
prices. As prices began to stall, however, one expects that the fundamentalists with stock 
are the first to sell. This may explain the fairly rapid turn in the market -- in the absence 
of much new and negative information -- in early 2000, when stocks which had been 
rising rapidly for some time stalled briefly before moving decisively lower. When prices 
are no longer rising, the value buyers could not be expected to step in until the prices 
were a tiny fraction of the peak trading price. Of course, once the trend is clearly 
downward, the momentum traders sell in force. Without any significant group with 
interest in buying, and many interested in selling, prices fall precipitously. 
    Our analysis displays the interaction between the strategies of different types of traders 
with their cash/asset position. Understanding this relationship is the key to the dynamics 
of financial markets. Contrary to the efficient market idealization, there are different 
motivations behind trades, and it would be impossible to predict where these motivations 
would lead without having a quantitative basis for assessing the impact of these traders. 
In gauging the effect of a particular group the sentiment and strategy must be combined 
with their cash and asset positions within some set of price dynamics equations.  
    The equations we present do not have any a priori bias toward behavioral finance. If 
there were no significant tendency for traders to buy on rising prices, that particular 
coefficient would simply be estimated as zero by the statistical procedure. Hence this 
hybrid approach (statistical combined with difference equations) has the advantage of 
minimizing any bias in modeling. 
    As noted earlier, traders are classified during each period, and we now examine the 
transition rates between the momentum and fundamental groups during the periods T-4 to 
T+2. The details are presented in the Appendix. In general we find that the transition 
from momentum to fundamental is reasonably low (about 12%) through period T-2.  Near 
the peak of the bubble, in periods T-1 through T+1 the transition probability triples to 
36%.  This is consistent with a simple learning process (i.e., participants are learning to 
focus on the realistic value) though it does not appear to be a linear function of time (see 
Appendix). When we examine the transition from fundamental to momentum, the same 
learning hypothesis would suggest fewer such transitions with increasing time. We find a 
more complex picture, however. Only 9% make the transition from fundamental to 
momentum during periods T-4 and T-3. Later, against a backdrop of soaring prices (and 
declining fundamental value), the transition probability jumps to 37% in period T-2, 
suggesting that traders are not simply learning to focus on valuation. Rather, even some 
of those who started with a sound valuation strategy (i.e., not bidding on the asset at 
prices that are clearly more than the expected return) are swept into momentum trading 
with rapidly rising prices. This is a further indication that the cause of the bubble is not 
simply inexperience and confusion with trading strategy. A key cause is the abandonment 
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of value based investing by the value traders. After the bubble has peaked, the transition 
probabilities (fundamental to momentum) also decline. 
    In summary, the trading strategies of both groups appear to be very stable – under 11% 
in either direction during the early periods (T-4 and T-3) – until prices begin to rise 
rapidly above the fundamental value. It is only after a large rise in prices that a significant 
fraction of fundamentalists become momentum traders. Momentum traders change 
strategy in significant numbers only near the peak (T-1, T and T+1) as the soaring prices 
plateau. Thus, the traders appear to understand the trading strategy options available to 
them from the outset. Through adaptive learning they respond to the changing 
environment created by their fellow traders. For some, the value based investing appears 
to be a good strategy, but by period T-2 they observe that a momentum strategy would 
have served their interests better. Through adaptive learning they switch to a momentum 
strategy. Soon after this point, however, trading prices begin to level off since much of 
the available cash for buying so far above fundamental value has already been used. Once 
prices are no longer soaring, there is continued adaptive learning, particularly on the part 
of the momentum traders, as they switch in much larger numbers during T-1 and later 
periods to a value strategy. Thus there is a complex adaptive learning process that is 
intertwined with the basic conservation laws of cash and asset. 
     From the perspective of these experiments, a good forecaster of the peak is the sharp 
spike in the transition rate from fundamental to momentum strategies which occurs 
approximately two periods prior to the peak and about two or three periods after prices 
have moved above fundamental value. World market bubbles often exhibit a stage when 
long-time value investors relinquish their strategy and join the bubble.      
    With the insight gained from this analysis of experiments, the question arises as to how 
one can extract some of the relevant information in ordinary markets to utilize this 
approach. The necessary information consists of: (i) an estimate of the motivations of 
different groups, (ii) the asset sizes of the various groups.  A key step in this direction 
would be to examine the data of the late stages of the high-tech bubble of the late 1990’s 
and attempt to classify traders based upon the trade size, from 100 shares to block trades. 
One can then examine the nature of the trades, e.g., the fraction of these trades are on the 
“uptick,” i.e., when the trade occurs on the high end of the spread, and the fraction of 
trades that occur when prices are rising within a specified small time period. If the 
information is available, one can determine whether the orders are limit orders or market 
orders. In previous studies, it has been shown that parameters estimated in experiments 
were close to those of the NYSE data for closed-end funds. Thus, the experimental 
parameters could be used as an approximation for the true values in the market, until 
optimization methods offer more accurate values. Surveys and brokerage data on the 
trading of individuals could also provide the useful information. Within our approach one 
needs only an average value for a group so that is possible to utilize aggregate cash/asset 
data for a group analogous to our experimental data. 
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        The statistics are presented below for the transition rates between momentum and 
fundamental traders. 
 
  Momentum trader to 
fundamental trader 
Fundamental trader to 
momentum trader 
T-4  9.72% 11.00% 
T-3  10.71% 7.14% 
T-2  14.79% 37.16% 
T-1  37.41% 11.17% 
T  27.81% 23.77% 
T+1  43.49% 22.62% 
T+2  29.70% 17.83% 
 
Table 8. Average transition probabilities. 
 
        First we consider the conditional probability that a trader who is classified as 
momentum in one period will be classified as fundamental in the next period.  Define a 
variable D as D = 0 for the periods T-4 through T-2, and D = 1 for periods T-1 through 
T+2. Then the linear regression for the transition probability on D leads to  
 
Momentum trader to fundamental trader transition probability = 11.7 + 22.9 D 
 
so that there is strong statistical evidence (p-value = 0.004) that the transition probability 
triples during the peak of the bubble. The detailed statistics are displayed in Table 10. 










t-ratio  p-value 
Constant  11.740 3.381  3.470  0.018 
D  22.862 4.473  5.110  0.004 
      
  R
2:83.9%  R
2Adj: 80.7%     
 

















11.740 + 22.862 D
 
Fig. 4. Momentum to fundamental trader transition probability. 
     
    Next we consider the transition probabilities from fundamental to momentum trading. 
Now defining D = 0 for periods T-4 and T-3 and D = 1 for the remaining periods, we 
have the linear regression 
 
Fundamental trader to momentum trader transition probability = 9.07 + 13.4 D, 
 
so that there is some statistical evidence (p-value = 0.12) that the transition probability 
increases by 50% during the peak of the bubble. The detailed statistics are displayed in 









Constant  9.070 6.117  1.480  0.198 
D  13.440 7.238  1.860  0.122 
      
  R
2:40.8%  R
2Adj: 29.0%     
 

























9.070 + 13.440 D
 
Fig. 5. Fundamental to momentum trader transition probability. 
  
       A quadratic regression for this transition probability yields the fitted graph in Figure 
6.  
 














23.010 - 0.625 Time -
0.992 Time^2
 
Fig. 6. Fundamental to momentum trader transition probability. 
 
Hence the peak of the transition probability is near the peak of the bubble, and begins to 
fall off afterwards. 
    The regression equation is 
 
Fundamental trader to momentum trader transition probability  
                                                                              = 23.01 - 0.625 Time - 0.992 Time
2 
 
        Thus one observes an increase in the transition probability from fundamental to 
momentum as the bubble is forming, contrary to a basic learning model in which 




value oriented strategy. Similarly, Table 5 shows that the number of fundamental traders 
does not increase (and the number of momentum traders does not decrease) until the peak 
is attained. This is confirmed by regressing the numbers of traders in each group with 
time (through period T-1).  During the period T-1 through T+2, however, a similar 
regression shows that there is a statistically significant increase in the number of 
fundamental traders (p-value = 0.028) and decrease in the number of momentum traders 
(p-value = 0.086). On average during these periods there is a net increase of 1 in the 
difference between the numbers of fundamental and momentum traders. Thus learning to 
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